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Abstract 
The aim of the study is to investigate the determinants of abnormal audit fees in 
Nigerian quoted companies, with specific emphasis on how the firm size, Big4, 
profitability, joint audit, and leverage impact on abnormal audit fee. The study 
involved about eighty four (84) manufacturing companies quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange as at 31st December 2014. A sample of 56 companies representing 
67% was finally selected for the study. Panel regression estimation technique was 
used in the analysis of the variables. The choice of the panel regression technique is 
premised on its quality of unbiasedness, increased data point, and control for 
individual heterogeneity. To test the accuracy of the model, we employed the classical 
regression assumption tests of normality, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and 
multi co-linearity. The study found a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the interaction of Big 4 audit firms and firm size and the dependent variable 
of abnormal audit fees which implies that large firms using Big 4 audit firms tend to 
pay abnormal audit fees. We, therefore, recommend that large firms should patronise 
reputable indigenous audit firms. 
Keywords: Abnormal audit fee, firm size, profitability, joint audit, leverage 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the developed countries of Europe and America, empirical 
consideration on issues of abnormal audit fees is sparse, except for Choi, Kim and 
Zang (2006) on abnormal audit fees and audit quality; Xie, Cai, and Ye (2010) on 
abnormal audit fees and audit opinion. However, the same cannot be said of 
developing countries with emphasis on Nigeria. In general, whether in the 
developed or developing countries, issues of determinants of abnormal audit fees 
have not received much empirical attention, safe for Ilaboya and Campbell 
(2015). This paucity of empirical literature creates a knowledge gap which forms 
the basis of this current contribution. Therefore, the fundamental objective of this 
study is to investigate the determinants of abnormal audit fees. 
From casual empiricism, if normal and abnormal audit fees are borne out 
of the services of the auditor, it is therefore expected that the determinants of 
normal audit fees should be the same as the determinants of abnormal audit fees. 
However, the truism of this assertion lacks empirical justification, hence the 
motivation for the study. 
This study contributes to the small but burgeoning body of knowledge 
on the dynamics of the determinants of abnormal audit fees by bridging the gap 
occasioned by sparse empiric in this regard. In Nigeria, while this may not be the 
first attempt on the issue, we also made a methodological advancement having 
focused on 56 manufacturing companies compared to the narrow Nigerian 
banking sector which was the focus of the earlier study. 
In a preview of the regression result, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between firm size, the interaction between firm size and Big 4 and 
the dependent variable of abnormal audit fees. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the variable of Big 4 and abnormal audit fees is both negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section two focuses on 
an empirical review of the literature, section three addresses methodology of the 
study with an emphasis on analytical framework and modelling, section four 
focuses on estimation results and discussion of findings, while section five 
concludes the study.       
 
2.  REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.1.  Abnormal Audit Fees  
Audit fees are of two types. The first are normal fees, which reflect the 
cost to perform the audit, including labour costs, expected litigation risk losses 
and normal profit (Simunic, 1980; Choi, Lui&Sumunic, 2005, Asthana & Boone 
2012). Normal fees are usually determined by factors that are common across 
different clients such as client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk.The 
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second kind is abnormal fees that include abnormal profits from audit 
engagement (Asthana & Asthana, 2012). These are fees specific to an auditor-
client relationship (Higgs &Stantz, 2006; Choi, Kim & Zang, 2006). Extant 
empirical literature is replete with studies on the determinants of audit (normal) 
fees. (Antle, Gordon, Naraymoorthy& Zhou, 2006; Asthana & Asthana, 2012; 
Choi, et al., 2005; Simunic, 1980; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy & 
Raghynandan, 2003). But the same cannot be said of abnormal audit fees. 
 
2.2. Firm Size and Abnormal Audit Fees  
Simunic (1980) pioneered the publication in this subject area and firm 
size seems to be the core explanatory variable in the study of abnormal audit fees. 
This appears intuitive because, audit fees are paid according to the time spent in 
completing a given job. Bigger companies are usually involved in a greater 
number of transactions that necessarily require longer hours for an auditor to 
inspect. Whisenant et al., (2003); Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter (1993); and 
Ashbaugh, Lafond, and Mayhew (2003) found a positive relationship between 
firm size and audit fees. Different measures of company size exists: total assets 
(Taylor & Baker, 1981) ; total sales and number of employees 
(Haskim&Williams, 1988). According to Sandra and Patrick (1996), the 
relationship between the size of the clients firm and abnormal audit fees is 
unlikely to be linear. Pong (1999) observed that it is possible that both assets and 
turnover feature in a model of the determination of abnormal audit fee. According 
to Karim and Moizer (1996), the internal control procedures are likely to be more 
sophisticated in larger companies than smaller ones. The internal control system 
reduces the risk of errors, and due to this, the total time of the audit will be 
decreased. 
 
2.3. Big 4 and Abnormal Audit Fees 
According to Francis (1984) larger audit firm will charge higher fees to 
deliver high-quality services in a competitive market in which there is a demand 
for service differentiation. Thus, audit fees can be used to analyse audit quality 
and whether there is a demand for differentiation in auditing market. There is still 
uncertainty as to whether being one of the large audit firms (KPMG, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, and Price Water House Coopers) increases the fees charged for 
auditing and consulting services. Palmrose (1986) hypothesised three scenario in 
explaining Big4 and audit fees: the monopolistic nature of the market require high 
fees; fee premium is charged due to the expected quality of audit and the 
proposition of lower prices as a result of economies of scale. 
DeAngelo (1981b) takes the same perspective and emphasised that large 
firms will lose more regarding reputation when they make a mistake and, 
therefore, have an added incentive to do quality work. Other authors also note the 
existence of the price premium charged by the Big4 auditors (Whisenant et al., 
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2003; Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa, 2011).Ashbaughet al., (2003) and Defond, 
Raghunanda, and Subramanyam (2002) show that companies that hire Big Four 
firms pay higher consulting fees, but Antle et al. (2006) did not find any 
significant result. 
 
2.4. Profitability and Abnormal Audit Fees  
Profitability is the level of profit in relation to the volume of activity. 
The profitability of the client can be determined by either the income or loss 
figure disclosed in the income statement (Firth, 1997; Francis & Simon 1987; 
Low, Tan, & Koh, 1990; and Karim & Moizer, 1996). Different measures of 
profit have featured in different accounting researches such as: return on asset 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on 
investment (ROI). Clients disclosing high-level of profit may lead to higher audit 
fees (Pong et al. 1994). It has been established in extant literature that the amount 
of audit fees is a function of the profitability of the audit client (Sandra & Patrick, 
1996) even though some other researches have established a negative relationship 
between profitability and audit fees (Sankaraguruswam & Whisenant, 2005). 
 
2.5. Joint Audit and Abnormal Audit Fees 
Joint audit occurs in a situation where two or more auditors are involved 
with the audit of business entity resulting in one audit report. The auditors in a 
joint audit assignment perform both audit planning and field work together. In 
addition to improving the quality of audit, joint audit provides a reasonable check 
on the auditors’ diligence and ensures the independence of the auditors (Piot 
&Janin, 2007). The effect of joint audit on abnormal audit fees is a function of the 
interaction between the auditors. That is, companies with joint audit pay 
significantly less for their audit than companies without joint audit, hence, there 
is a negative relationship (Gonthier-Besacier & Schatt, 2007). The relationship 
tends to be vague if the joint audit involves a Big4 and a smaller audit firm 
(Lesage, Ratzinger-Sakel & Kettune, 2012). Against the above backdrop, the 
relationship between joint audit and abnormal audit fees is ambiguous. This 
ambiguity creates a gap that this research will fill. 
 
2.6. Leverage and Abnormal Audit Fees  
Lu and Sapra (2009) observe that companies with higher business risk 
are associated with auditor conservatism and that increased customer pressure 
improves auditing quality in this situation. Zaman et al. (2011) opine that 
leverage is positively related to abnormal audit and consulting fees because, 
companies that are highly levered require more careful monitoring to shelter them 
from financial and market risks. Bedard and Johnstone (2004) and Defond et 
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al.,(2002) find a positive relationship between leverage and abnormal audit fees. 
While Chaney, , and Shivakumar (2004) report a positive relationship between 
short-term financial risk and auditing expenses concerning consulting, Ashbaugh 
et  al., (2003) identify a positive relationship between leverage and consulting fee. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Analytical Framework and Model Specification 
The framework for the analysis of the determinants of abnormal audit 
fees in Nigeria quoted companies is the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency 
theory. The theory addresses the relationship between resource owners and 
resource managers which often results in conflict of interest. Alchaian and 
Demsetz (1972) were the first to argue that monitoring the performance of 
individual work effort is always at a cost to any firm and those organizational 
inefficiencies are created when the flow of information on individual performance 
is decreased or blocked. The agency theory advanced two main conflict: How to 
align the conflicting goals of the principal and the agent and how to ensure that 
the performance of the agent is in tandem with the expectations of the 
manager.The solution to either of these agency problems is to ensure that 
executives or managers act in best interest of the owners by increasing the 
amount and quality of information available to the principals and making senior 
executives part owners of the firm through their compensations packages (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1983). 
Against the above backdrop, we expect that abnormal audit fees will be 
related to the size of the firm. Consistent with Antle et al., 2006; Choi et al., 
2005; Simunic, 1980; &Whisenant et al., 2003) a functional relationship is 
expected between the size of the firm and abnormal audit fee in the form: 
ABNFEE= f (firm size) - - - - - - -          (i) 
In the same vein, we expect the interaction between firm size and Big 4 
auditors to be related to abnormal audit fees. This is because; the size of the firm 
or company will mean complex activities that may require the services of the Big 
4 firms. 
From extant literature, profitability is related to normal audit fees (Pong 
& Whittington,1994; Sandra et al., 1996;). It is also expected that more profitable 
firms will pay abnormal audit fees. Hence, a significant relationship exists 
between firm profitability and abnormal audit fees (Chan, Ezzammel, Gwilliam 
1993; Hay, Knechel, and Wong, 2006). Therefore  
ABNFEE = f (Profitability) -  - - - -          (ii) 
Joint audit is also expected to relate to abnormal audit fees.Gontheir-
Besacier et al., (2007) observed a negative relationship between joint audit and 
audit fee. Therefore; 
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ABNFEE = f (Joint Aud)  - - - - - -        (iii) 
Consistent with Lu et al. (2009), leverage is related to normal audit fees. 
Consistent with Bedard et al. (2002); Chaney et al. (2004);Defond, Francis and Wong 
(2002) and Zaman et al. (2011), there exist a positive relationship between leverage and 
abnormal audit fees. Hence, 
ABNFEE = f (Leverage) - -- - - - -           (iv) 
Collecting equations 1,2,…, 4 in a functional form, we have; 
ABNFEE = f(firm size, big 4,  profitability,  joint audit, leverage)  -          (v) 
Equation (vii) is expressed in econometric form as; 
ABNFEEit = β1 + β2Fsizeit + β3 Big4it + β4Fsize*Big4 + β5 Joint audit + β6 
Profit–Marginit 
+ β7Levit + it - - -- - - - -         (vi) 
Where; ABNFEE = Abnormal audit fee;F size = Firm size,Big 4 = Big Four 
;Profit -- margin Profitability; Joint aud = Joint audit ;Lev = leverage  
It is presumptively expected that, 
β2,β3,β4,β5, β6, β7>0 from theory and extant literature. 
The table below explains the dependent (regressand) variables, 
independent variables (regressors), how these variables are measured, the sources 
of information and the co-efficient sign expected. 
Table 1 










ABNFEE Measured as 5 years industry 









Big Four Big 4 Dummy variables, “I” for Big 




Profitability  Profit – 
Margin 





Joint Aud Joint audit engagement was 
measured as dummy; where 





Leverage  Lev Total dcbt/Total asset Zeman 
(2011) 
+ 
Source: Researcher’s compilation (2015). 
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3.2. Research Design 
The population of the study is the 84 manufacturing companies listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at December 2014. A total of 56 (fifty-six) firms 
were purposively (based on the availability of annual reports) selected to form the 
sample size of the study. The sample constitutes about 67% of the population 
which can be said to be representative of the population of study. 
 
3.3. Data Estimation Techniques 
Data was estimated using the Panel regression technique. The 
justification for using panel regression is that it gives a large number of data 
points, increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the co-linearity among 
explanatory variables. The research design adopted in this study is a combination 
of the time series and cross-sectional analysis because it will enable us to have an 
in-depth understanding of the determinants of abnormal audit fees in Nigerian 
companies.  
 
3.4. Regression Diagnostics 
To test the accuracy of the model, we carried out the usual diagnostic 
tests. We tested for the standard normal distribution of the regression variables 
using the standard Jarque-Bera test. 
2 21 ( 3)
6 4
N KJB S k      - - - - - - -        (vii) 
Where S = Skewness, K = Kurtosis,K =Estimated coefficient used to create the 
series 






















- -- - - - - -      (viii) 
To avoid some of the pitfalls of the Durbin-Waston statistics, we applied the 
Breusch-Godfrey test of the form: 
1 1 2 2 ...t t t p t pu XB Pu P u P u       -- - - -        (ix) 
With the chi-square test of nR2≈ X2 (df = p) 
We tested for the non-constant variance of the error term (heteroskedasticity) 
using the Breusch-pagan test of the form: 
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1 1 1 11 ( ) ( ) ( )bp u uI Z Z Z Z u uI
V
   
 - - - -          (x) 
Where u = (e12, e22,…eu2) 










- - - - - - -        (xi) 
In testing for specification error, we adopted the Ramsey RESET test which 
assumes that: 
1 2 3iYi Xi V     - - - -- - -        (xii) 
2 3
1 2 3 4
ˆ












     - - -      (xiv) 
With high f value, it means the model is not mis-specified  
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
FINDINGS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The table below reveals the mean deviation of the variables in the study, 









/Number of new regressors 
/(n-number of parameters in new model.  
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Table 2 
Results of the Descriptive Statistics 
 ABNFEE JOINTAUD BIG4 FSIZE PAT_MAGIN TL_TA 
 Mean  9129.043  0.028133  0.800512  7.003785  0.013632  0.581253 
 Median  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  6.950000  0.060000  0.560000 
 Maximum  209468.0  1.000000  1.000000  8.540000  0.710000  1.680000 
 Minimum -11000.00  0.000000  0.000000  4.940000 -11.23000 -0.410000 
 Std. Dev.  29304.00  0.165565  0.400128  0.769052  0.592283  0.226403 
 Skewness  3.806106  5.707399 -1.504002 -0.064582 -17.61437  0.566928 
 Kurtosis  20.65591  33.57440  3.262022  2.090932  333.9509  5.721890 
 
 Jarque-Bera  6022.654  17352.12  148.5269  13.73532  1804621.  141.6448 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.001041  0.000000  0.000000 
 
 Sum  3569456.  11.00000  313.0000  2738.480  5.330000  227.2700 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.35E+11  10.69054  62.43990  230.6618  136.8114  19.99069 
 
 Observations  391  391  391  391  391  391 
Source: Researchers computation (e-views 8) 2015 
 
The result of the descriptive statistics shows large JarqueBera values 
which imply that the regression variables follow the standard normal distribution. 
This is evident in the bell-shaped histogram in figure 1. The standard deviations 
are relatively small except the abnormal audit fee with a standard deviation of 
29302.4. The result of the standard deviation shows that the variables are 
clustered round the mean. The mean abnormal audit fee is #9,129M with 
maximum and minimum values of #209468 and #-11,000 respectively. The 
positive kurtosis shows the variables are highly peaked near the mean. 
The table below shows the histogram normality test of the regression 
variables and the degree of skewness of variables examined. 
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Figure 1 Result of the Histogram Normality Test 
 
The histogram normality test revealed a mean Jarque- Bera value of 
8947.687 and an associated probability value of 0.000000 which reveals the 
normality of the regression variables. The bell-shaped histogram is an evidence of 
normal distribution. The mean kurtosis value of 24.99624 shows leptokurtic 
distribution. The positive skewness of 4.043015 shows rightward skew as seen in 
figure 1. 
The table below examines the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables with a view to unveiling the degree of correlation between 
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Table 3 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
 
Source: Researchers Computation (E-Views 8). 
 
The result of the coefficient of correlation shows mixed coefficient. The 
dependent variable is negatively correlated with joint audit and leverage. The 
correlation coefficients are relatively small which implies weak correlation. The 
highest correlation coefficient is 0.609596 between abnormal audit fee and firm 
size. Consistent with Bryman and Cramer (1997), the result of the coefficient of 
correlation is not indicative of any problem of multi co-linearity in the regression 
variables. The result is further strengthened by the outcome of the test of variance 
inflation factor. The result of the variance inflation factor further confirmed the 
absence of multi co-linearity in the regression variables. The centred vif values 
are all below the benchmark of 10 which means there is no problem of multi co-
linearity. The highest centred VIF value is firm size, with a value of 7.225929. 
The regression analysis is preceded by the classical regression 
assumption tests of heteroskerodasticity (using the Breusch – Pagan – Godfrey 








Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 5.584965    Prob. F(5,385) 0.0801 
Obs*R-squared 26.44212    Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0701 
Scaled explained SS 306.8457    Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0600 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: UNTITLED   
Specification: ABNFEE C  JOINTAUD BIG4 FSIZE PAT_MAGIN TL_TA 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
 Value Df Probability  
t-statistic  9.423849  384  0.100  
F-statistic  88.80893 (1, 384)  0.200  
Likelihood ratio  81.34708  1  0.0100  
F-test summary:   
 
 
The result of the diagnostics could not sustain the null hypothesis of 
heteroskedastic residuals and model misspecification as indicated in Table 4. The 
alternative hypotheses of homoskedasticity and well-specified models were 
accepted given the probability values of .0801 and 0.100 > 0.05. 
The table below (Panel least square), shows the relationship between the 




Dependent Variable: ABNFEE 
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/08/15   Time: 16:50   
Sample: 2008 2014   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 56   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 391  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -69114.18 26118.16 -2.646212 0.0085 
JOINTAUD -3280.229 7094.205 -0.462381 0.6441 
FSIZE 9667.025 4068.463 2.376088 0.0180 
BIG4 -96396.43 29794.26 -3.235403 0.0013 
PAT_MAGIN 152.0319 2006.264 0.075779 0.9396 
TL_TA 871.0707 5425.501 0.160551 0.8725 
FSIZE*BIG4 15276.36 4485.010 3.406094 0.0007 
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R-squared 0.393647    Mean dependent var 9129.043 
Adjusted R-squared 0.384173    S.D. dependent var 29304.00 
S.E. of regression 22996.21    Akaike info criterion 22.94179 
Sum squared resid 2.03E+11    Schwarz criterion 23.01284 
Log likelihood -4478.119    Hannan-Quinn criter. 22.96995 
F-statistic 41.54905    Durbin-Watson stat 0.604628 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Source: Researchers Computation (E-Views 8) 2015. 
 
The result of the panel least square regression shows that about 38% of 
the cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable of abnormal audit fee is 
accounted for by the explanatory variables of firm size, Big 4, profit margin, 
leverage, joint audit and the interaction between firm size and Big 4. The F-
statistic of 41.54905 and the associated probability value of 0.000000 is 
indicative of a linear relationship between the dependent and the explanatory 
variables. 
There exist a positive and significant positive relationship between the 
variable of firm size and abnormal audit fee. The implication of this finding is 
that larger firms attract abnormal audit fee. This is consistent with Carson, 
(2009); Davis et al.(1993); Whisenant et al.(2003) who also found a positive 
relationship between firm size and abnormal audit fee. 
The negative relationship between the Bigfour audit firm and abnormal 
audit fee is beyond the likelihood of chance. The variable reported a t-value of -
3.235403 and a probability value of 0.0013, which is negative and statistically 
significant. Even though the finding is not consistent with the extant empirical 
literature on abnormal audit fees. Most studies on the relationship between Big 4 
and abnormal audit fees, tend to be positive and significant (Carson (2009); 
Francis (1984); Palmrose (1986); Whisenant et al., (2003); Zaman et al., (2011). 
However, Antle, et al., (2006), did not find a significant relationship. The reason 
for the absence of the fee premium may be ascribed to the technological and 
professional competence of the Big 4 audit firms even though this position lacks 
empirical justification. 
The interaction between firm size and Big 4 audit firm is both positive 
and significant. This indicates that if the size of the firm warrants the services of 
the Big 4 audit firm, there is the tendency for abnormal audit fees. This position is 
consistent with the positive relationship between Big 4 and abnormal audit fees 
(DeAngelo (1981b); Zaman et al. (2011) and moreover, the positive relationship 
between firm size and abnormal audit fees. (Ashbaugh et al. (2003); Davis et al. 
(1993); Whisenant et al. (2003). 
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The variables of  leverage and profitability are both positive and 
insignificant having reported t-values of 0.160551 and 0.075779 respectively. 
This is consistent with Ashbaughet . al., (2003); Bedard et al., (2004); Defond et 
al., (2002); Zaman et al., (2011)  who found apositive relationship between 
leverage and abnormal audit fees. In the same vein, Chan (1993); Pong et al., 
(1994); Sandra et al., (1998); found a positive relationship between profitability 
and abnormal audit fees. 
The variable of joint audit was negative and insignificant which means 
joint audit reduces the tendency for abnormal audit fees. This is consistent with 
Gonthier-Besacier et al., (2007). 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The broad objective of the study is to investigate the determinants of 
abnormal audit fees in Nigerian quoted companies. It is observed that a positive 
and significantly positive relationship exists between the variable of firm size and 
abnormal audit fees. There is a negative and significant relationship between the 
Big 4 audit firms and abnormal audit fees. However, the interaction between the 
Big 4 audit firms and firm size and abnormal audit fees is positive and significant. 
A positive and insignificant relationship exists between leverage and profitability. 
Finally, there is a negative and insignificant relationship between joint audit and 
abnormal audit fees. 
Against the backdrop of the empirical findings, the following 
recommendations were advanced: The positive relationship between firm size and 
abnormal audit fees means that organizations should strive towards moderate-
sized firms. In the same vein, the positive relationship between the interaction of 
Big 4 audit firms and firm size and abnormal audit fees implies that large firms 
using Big 4 audit firms tend to pay abnormal audit fees. We therefore recommend 
that large firms should patronize reputable indigenous audit firms. The negative 
relationship between joint audit and abnormal audit fees shows that joint audit 
reduces abnormal audit fees. We therefore recommend that organizations should 
embrace joint audit.   
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ODREDNICE NEUOBIČAJENIH REVIZORSKIH 
NAKNADA U KOTIRANIM NIGERIJSKIM TVRTKAMA 
 
Sažetak 
Cilj ovoga rada je istražiti odrednice neuobičajenih revizorskih naknada u 
kotiranim nigerijskim tvrtkama s posebnim osvrtom na utjecaj veličine tvrtke, 
Big4, profitabilnosti, zajedničke revizije i financijske poluge na previsoku 
revizorsku naknadu. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo 84 proizvodne tvrtke koje kotiraju 
na nigerijskoj burzi na dan 31. prosinca 2014. Uzorak od 56 tvrtki, koje 
predstavljaju 67 % ukupno obrađenih tvrtki, odabrano je za ovaj rad. Tehnika 
procjene panel regresije korištena je za analizu varijabli. Ova tehnika odabrana 
je zbog nepristranosti i kontrole individualne heterogenosti. Kako bi se testirala 
preciznost modela, korišten je klasični regresijski test normaliteta, 
heteroskedastičnosti, serijske korelacije i multiple kolinearnosti. Rezultati 
istraživanja pokazali su pozitivan i statistički značajan odnos između revizorskih 
tvrtki Big4 i veličine tvrtke te zavisne varijable neuobičajenih revizorskih 
naknada, što upućuje na to da velike tvrtke koje koriste usluge Big4 plaćaju 
neuobičajene revizorske naknade. Zbog toga smatramo da bi velike tvrtke trebale 
biti pokrovitelji uglednih domaćih revizorskih tvrtki. 
Ključne riječi: neuobičajene revizorske naknade, veličina tvrtke, profitabilnost, 
zajednička revizija, financijska poluga. 
JEL klasifikacija: L25, G29, M42  
 
 
 

